

GOVERNANCE AND TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: AN APPRAISAL OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NORTHEASTERN NIGERIA

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Abstract

This study was conducted to establish the relationship between governance and terrorism in Nigeria. The study was aimed at determining the factors that may be responsible for emergence of Jamatul Ahalis Sunna Lidawa'ati wal- jihad (Better known as Boko Haram) in Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study were to determine the relationship between governance failure and Boko Haram. Documentation research design was used for the study. The major research findings based on the research questions answered revealed that, there were significant relationship between bad governance and the emergence of insurgencies like Boko Haram in Nigeria due to the inability of the state to discharge its responsibility. Poverty, unemployment, youth restiveness, bad leadership, according to the findings are not only a manifestation of governance failure but had exacerbated general insecurity there by led to terrorist and terrorism. On the basis of these findings, the study concluded that good governance must be provided in terms of provision of employment, curtail poverty and youth restiveness. The study recommends among others that the state must create opportunities for employment, dialogue with aggrieved sect group and good governance.

Keywords: Terrorism, Governance, Boko Haram

1. Background to The Study

The yearning for civic order and enfranchisement in the system is the overwhelming desire of ordinary men and women around the world (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). The ground reality is that many states have collapsed and are unable to provide even the most basic service for their citizens. Nigerians simply want their country to function. But their daily encounters with the state produce frustration and humiliation. The failure to maintain basic order not only makes fear a constant of daily life but also provides a breeding ground for a small minority to perpetuate criminality and terror.

Terrorism can be construed to mean essentially the systematic use of violence, terror and intimidation to achieve an end. It is a method whereby an organized group seeks to achieve its avowed aim through the systematic use of violence. (Grover 2002). The terrorists desire that the government as well as the people accept their views and orders by terror if not by reason. Over a decade now, Nigeria has been bedevilled by terrorists' activities ranging from Niger-Delta militia, kidnapping. Especially in the south east, turf war by militarized cults and gangs in the Bayelsa area, violent armed robberies across the entire country, and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidawa'ati wal-jihad (Also known as Boko Haram). Insurgence in northern part of Nigeria.

Due to the growing threat of terrorism in Nigeria and the entire globe, quite a number of attempts had been made to probe the causes and the consequence of terrorism. Security organizations recognize that crumbling states are at the root of ongoing conflicts, terrorism and expanding network of criminality. Developmental institutions are beginning to discover that the effective state is the necessary condition for eradicating poverty. A consensus is now emerging that only sovereign states, by which we mean states that can actually perform the function that make them sovereign will allow human progress to continue. Security, stability and development, according to (Ghani and Lockhart 2008) cannot thrive in areas of the world that suffer from chronic misgovernance. Groups involved in terrorism, criminality and arms thrive on areas of mis- rule. The vicious networks they spawn can be controlled only if the state functions based on effective governance.

Governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of countries economic and social resources. The World Bank (1992, 1994), identifies distinct aspect of governance as: the forms of political regime; the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's resources economic and social resources for development and the capacity of governance to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions. The state is the most effective unit of organization of the polity, and According to EL-Rufai (2012), Income inequality, unemployment and poverty have been shown to correlate strongly with increases in violent crimes in societies. This cocktail is what Carson (2012) referred to when he stated that Nigerian Boko Haram was capitalizing on popular discontent with bad governance in Nigeria and the north in particular.

In July 2009 the government deployed the Nigerian army to crush Boko Haram. The leaders of the sect were captured alive or arrested from their homes and extra- judicially executed by the Nigerian police. They regrouped and went on what was essentially a revenge mission targeting the police, the Borno state government and other uniformed services of the federal government. That was how Boko Haram evolved from a largely peaceful fringe Islamic organization to a vengeful sect and currently an anarchist threat to the Nigerian nation. The watershed in the sect's activities were the June 2011 bombing of the police headquarters in Abuja and the August 2011 attack on the United Nations headquarters in Abuja. By these

actions the sects established the capacity to operate in the nation's capital outside its original geographic location thus attracting national and global attention. Sadly between 2009 and 2012 more than one thousand (1000) people have lost their lives as a result of Boko Haram's attacks in Maiduguri, Potiskum, Damaturu, Jos, Kano, Gombe, Kaduna and Abuja. In 2011 alone, Boko Haram attacked 115 times with 550 deaths resulting (El-Rufai, 2012).

Instability and insecurity are the word to characterize the current status of Nigeria. The extent to which security and stability is achieved depends on the delivery of functional governance. Wide spread poverty, illiteracy, high rate of unemployment especially among the youth and disappointments in the low quality leadership over the years, many have provided the fertile ground for the germination and nourishment of the insurgency in Nigeria. From 2009 a series of devastating attacks from Boko Haram to date has reached an alarming rate. This invariably has become a source of concern. It is against this background these studies intend to examine if there is relationship between governance failure and causes of terrorism in Nigeria.

These observations prompted this study to investigate if there is a relationship between governance failure which manifested as a result of the Nigerian state dysfunction and the emergence of terrorism in Nigeria by appraising the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Issues

2.1.1 Governance

Governance described as the exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society's problem and affairs. The World Bank (1992, 1994 ;), defines governance as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of country's economic and social resources for development".

According to Mazrud, (2002) good governance is the primary objective of democracy. Jega (2007) viewed "good governance as responsibility and responsiveness of public officials: both elected and appointed, to the electorate. The governed, aspirations of the governed as well as acting in accordance with the dictates". Nwabueze (2003) in his discourse as cited by Yakubu (2005).identified principles of good governance as: (i) guaranteed democratic rights and freedoms (ii) the rule of law with its various elements the protection of individual rights, the guarantee of fair trial and due process of law, the subjection of state officials to the law as well as the institutions and device necessary for its effective and meaningful operation, like the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judiciary,(iii) justice, with its adjunct equality – both equality before the law and equal treatment of citizens by the state.

2.1.2 Terrorism

Terrorism is riddled with a large number of complex and controversial issues, the most important ones relate to the –definition of terrorism; causes of terrorism; consequence of terrorism; and strategies to eradicate terrorism.

The definition of terrorism is the most controversial issue in all debates and discussions in terrorism. In an ideologically divided world, it is difficult to get a universally acceptable definition of terrorism. It is estimated that between 1936 and 1986, at list 115 different definitions of terrorism have been provided (Tyagi, 2002). How far these definitions differ with each other may be found from the following texts.

The oldest definition, as provided in the League of Nations, convention on terrorism, 1937 referred to terrorism in article 1 as “criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public” the convention included not only the commission of crime, but also attempts conspiracy incitements wilful participation and knowingly given assistance (article 3). According to the latest definition, as provided by Laqueur (1986:27) “terrorism has attempted to destabilize democratic societies and to show that their governments are impotent.

Terrorism may be a cause effect of one factor or set of factors at one place and another factor or a set of factors at another place. Generally, terrorism has its origin in diverse causes, viz, colonialism, neo colonialism, racialism, obscurantism, political persecution, human right violation, economic exploitation, unemployment, alienation, communication gap and an overall moral decay of society. Violence breeds violence. Terrorism belongs to different nationalities and other ethnic groups different religions and ideologies. The decisive element which distinguishes a terrorist from a criminal is the political motive. Identifying the political motive of an offence is very difficult. The following motivations may be responsible for terrorism (Oota, 1986:19):

2.1.3 Governance and Terrorism

Broadly defined, governance refers to the “process and institution; both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group” or government (Keohane and Nye, 2002:202) in Garge (2011: 1). The era Walter Laqueur called “the age of terrorism” roughly from the late 1960s to the present coincides with the largely unexpected diffusion of democracy around the world. At no time in the history have so many countries and so many people around the world been governed under democratic auspices.

One of the issues for Nigeria is security and this has been the result of poor governance (Chiya, 2010). Good governance model encompasses five basic elements: free market; the rule of law; political credibility; social justice; and education (Garge, 2011:2).

Nigeria is lacking in these entire contexts. Had the governance in terms of these parameters been effective, Nigeria would have progressed very well. In that case, according to scholars, there would not have been a large number of terror groups (Niger delta militia, Bakasi boys, kidnapping, Boko haram etc), as they exist presently. In essence Nigeria has many terror groups in operation and spreading lots of chaos in the country. The responsibility to control and fully eliminate them lies with the government. The Boko haram siege, however, exposed gap between the promise of public service and its delivery that lies at the roots of the government inability to respond effectively to the challenges of terrorism.

Accordingly, Garge, (2011) concludes that while dealing with the roots of terrorism one must not forget to deliver fostering developments that gives people hopes and dignity and elevate their standards of living with quality resources to access. This requires a dramatic improvement in governance. This emphasis is that there is a relationship between good governance and secure society, bad or failed governance and insecurity; as manifesting itself in terror and terrorism. Insecurity and the general political instability in Nigeria had been attributed to the problem of governance and leadership. According to Fagbadebo (2008), it obvious that governance issues are the bone of national development and political instability in Nigeria.

One of the major factors responsible for political instability is the failure of the political class to sufficiently adhere to the basic tenets of democracy and constitutionalism. (Kew, 2006). As Harriman (2006:2) has rightly noted, this situation “has

given rise to abuse of power, brazen corruption, disregard for due process and the rule of law, intolerance of political opposition, abuse of the electoral process and the weakening of institutions. This contradicts the tenets of governance which presupposes “the process of social engagement between the ruler and the ruled in a political community thereby exacerbated general insecurity; in the form of terrorism.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Boko Haram as Symptom of a Failed or Failing State

There are some who believe that Boko Haram is the clearest indication that Nigeria has become a failed or failing state (Adibe, 2012). Those who argue within this framework often rely on the notion that state should have the monopoly of legitimate violence in its territory. State failure can be understood within the context of certain functional requisites that a modern state is supposed to perform, such as maintenance of law and order, maintaining the internal security and sovereignty of the state against internal subversion and external invasion, provision of social amenities and basic welfare services. It is the inability of state to accomplish these tasks that manifests failure (Otto, 2006). In other words, the state institutions inability to deal with all manners of activities that are inimical and antithetical to survival of the state.

There are various indices to measure the failure of state. First when the state is not able to deliver political goods to the people. The fundamental political goods are the security of the people and the preservation of law and order. State failures manifest and become evident when the state no longer can protect and preserve its own institution and maintain national security. State failure is the gradual weakening of a state capacity to provide good legitimate governance. The resultant effect of this according to (Otto 2006:322) “is civil and communal strife, humanitarian crises such as starvation and mass refugees movement, increasing criminal activities and large scale corruptions of government officials, the collapse of the formal economy, given way to informal economy characterized by black market, extortion etc”.

In a failed state, the public institutions are poorly managed, hence are woefully lacking in the areas of transportation, power supply, education, health care delivery, etc. It boils down to the fact that the state lacks administrative capacity and innate corruption of the rulers that siphon the state funds abroad, while fewer capital resources are available for the maintenance of public infrastructure and other facilities. Under this condition the state abdicates its responsibility to its people under the guise of private sector participation. The states lack the ability to promote economic growth by expanding institutional capacity or the development of the productive base, providing for the well being of the citizens, and improving the standard of living, reducing economic dependence, poverty, unemployment, and increasing the share of the total output of goods and services in the world economy.

The argument is that Nigeria is failed or failing state because it has lost that monopoly not only to boko haram but also to kidnapers and armed robbers. And that Nigeria over the years has demonstrated its inability to discharge its function to the citizens in terms of good leadership functional institution and services.

The closest to an extant taxonomy for measuring a failed state is the failed state index published since 2005 by fund for peace and conjunction with the journal foreign policy, uses the following to determine the extent to which a state has failed or failing: (I) loss of control of its territory or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. (ii) Inability to provide public services. Nigeria, since 2007 has been in the league of the worst 20 cases in the failed state index. This argument or failed state thesis according to some critics (e.g.

Adibe, 2012) is not very convincing because there are countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia which are regarded as “successful” but were some of its cities and sub-states are effectively under the control of militarised gangs.

The Frustration- Aggression Hypothesis

The theoretical proposition in basic framework specifies the conditions under which persons react emotionally to different reward situation. People who do not receive what they anticipate are expected to become angry and behave aggressively based on the original (Miller and Dollard 1941) “frustration- aggression” hypothesis. This theory attributes conflict to the outcome of frustration triggered by the gap between needs expectations and needs attainment. The argument here is that frustration causes aggression but when the source of the frustration cannot be challenged, the aggression gets displaced onto an innocent target. There are a number of explanations of the Boko Haram phenomenon that would seem to fit into the theory. For instance, the Central Bank of Nigeria Governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi was quoted by Daily Trust on January, 28, 2012 as blaming the rise of Boko Haram partly on economic inequality among states and regions caused by the principle of derivation, which gives 13 percent of oil revenue to the oil producing state. According to Sanusi “there is clearly a direct link between the very uneven nature of distribution of resources and the raising level of violence.

A variant of this explanation is that the huge sums allocated in training former Niger- Delta militants overseas under the amnesty programme of the late president Umaru Yar’adua may have the unintended effect of triggering envy and frustration or sending a message that violence pay. It may be argued; however, that while these may be partly true they cannot comprehensively explain why the Boko Haram type of violence is not generalized in the several states in the south which do not benefit from the 13% derivations. Another argument with the frustration is that after the reintroduction of Sharia law in the twelve (12) northern states, there was a widespread disillusionment at the way it was implemented, and members of the sect simply tapped into that frustration. As Jean Herskovits, an American expert on Nigerian politics was quoted as saying about it: “you punish somebody for stealing a goat or less- but a governor stealing billions of Naira and gets off scot- free”

Human- needs theorists would argue that one of the primary causes of protracted violence is people’s drive to meet their unmet needs. Since the publication of seminal book, *Deviance, terrorism, and war: the process of solving unsolved social and political problems* (1979), Burton (1990, 1997) has been closely identified with the theory of basic human needs, an approach to understanding protracted social conflict. Burton did not invent the theory, which posits the existence of certain universal needs that must be satisfied if people are to prevent or resolve destructive conflicts, but he gave it its most impassioned and uncompromising expression (Rubenstein, 2001).

Burton (1979) acknowledged his debt to Sites, (1973) whose *Control: Basis of social order*, defined essential needs whose satisfaction was required in order to produce “normal” (non-deviant, non- violent) individual behaviour. According to Sites these included the primary needs for consistency of response, stimulation, security, and recognition, and derivative needs for justice, meaning, rationality and control. Sites (1973) are a collaboration of Maslow’s (1954) conception of human development as the sequential satisfaction of basic needs, which had grouped into: physiological, safety, belongingness/love, esteem, and self- actualization.

The argument here is that the relative poverty in the north, especially in the north-east, the Boko Haram main base, disposes people to violence. Although this theory cannot

comprehensively explain the audacity of the sect's action or why similar groups have not emerged in other impoverished parts of the country, there are some merits in this theory that can fit to explain the phenomenon of the Boko haram insurgency. For instance, Clinton (2012), Campbell (2012) and Yusuf, (2012), had acknowledged that poverty fuel violence in Nigeria and blaming the increasing level of insecurity on poor governance. Therefore, the failed or failing state argument, the human needs theory and the frustration -aggression hypothesis are explanations of the symptoms or manifestation of the problem. The real issues are corruption, injustice and bad leadership, and Boko haram can be said to be the creation of these issues and therefore the sect is a symptom of the severe crises in the nations building project.

Conclusively, based on the strength and weaknesses of the three theories, human needs theory can better explain the phenomenon of boko haram; because all the causes can still boil down to the needs. But the study cannot deny the fact that the theories and their explanations are interlinked and each can be the cause of the emergence of the insurgency.

3. Jama'Atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram) In Nigeria

This chapter provide a brief background of Nigeria and that of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna lida'awati wal-jihad (boko haram) – The transformation, the ideology and the chronology of Boko Haram crisis.

3.1 Nigeria- a brief history.

Nigeria, paradoxically, is very young country, but it is a successor to several ancient civilizations, boasting of many historically spectacular pre-colonial systems of empires, kingdoms, and chiefdoms. The enduring impacts of these entities are still moderating though and action in the affairs of Nigeria. (Tijani, 2010: 192).

The name Nigeria was a 20th century coin age, but the Nigerian area was home for state systems some of which pre-dated the modern Nigerian state by centuries. No part of Nigeria or a community in Nigeria of some size, that had not experienced organized governance for at least 100 years before the imposition of colonialism on Nigeria at the beginning of the 20th century. For instance, it is with this reality in mind that Graff (quoted by Badru, 1998:4) had said: The territory of present Nigeria was defined not on the basis of its peoples shared historical, economic or social experience, but merely by arbitrary amalgamation of number of disparate ethno cultural units which happened to occupy contiguous land area that were then under British colonial administration. The modern Nigerian state is a country whose geographical local is given as: west between latitude 40 N and 140 N and longitude 30 E and 150 E meridians, bordered on west by republic of Benin, on North by Niger, on East by Chad and Cameroon and on south by the Gulf of Guinea. In size, Nigeria is about 913, 07359 km (or 356, 66959 miles). Nigeria is the second biggest country in Africa, and also Africa's most populous country, with human population estimated at 75million in 1976. Nigeria's population is now variously put between 140 and 150 million (NPC, 2009).

The country is home to about 250 different ethnic groups, each with its own Language (Graff, 1988), the three largest, the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Igbo's together are less than two-thirds of all Nigerians. The country is bifurcated between Christianity and Islam, with the south predominately the former, the North, the Latter. Both religions are militant, and the explosive expansion of Christianity in the North contributes to destabilizing the Islamic political and social status quo (Campbell, 2010). In terms of usual measurements of income, Nigeria's are very poor, with wealth from oil concentrated among a miniscule number of 'big men' Nigeria is run by competing and cooperating elites supported by their patron-client

networks, ethnic interests, big business, and the military. With the withdrawal of the military from active governance, none is strong enough to impose a specific direction in governance. Consequences include a chronic inability of the political system to address Nigeria's problems and the progressive alienation of nonlife Nigeria. In the Niger-Delta, heartland of Nigeria's natural resources wealth, an insurgency against the federal government continues despite an amnesty programme since 2009. In the North, current of radical, Islam had taken hold, and bloody uprisings against government authority are increasing in frequency. Growing numbers of Nigerians are alienated from their government and believe their nation is falling as a state. At present, Nigeria ranks perilously high ('bad') on the fund for peace failed state index, and near the bottom (also 'bad') of the united nations development programme's human development index (Campbell, 2010).

3.3. Background of Islamic Movement in Northern Nigeria

Islam, is at once a religion and a social order which seeks for governance a polity based upon the eternal principles laid down in the Qur'an and the Sunnah meant for practical application, Islam demands of believers to actively participate in the affairs of the world, to display a pious and honest character in all temporal activities and to struggle to establish the supremacy of the righteous moral code in all spheres of life (Moten, 1996) consequently, throughout Muslim history there have been movement to purge society of alien or non-Islamic accretions and to establish a viable civilization, a righteous orders guided by the shari'ah.

The current Islamic movement all over the Muslim world have their roots deep in the earlier period going back to the time of the prophet (SAAS). The western observes of Islam term these movements as fundamentalism terrorism, reactionary fanaticism and medieval mentality. Those engaged in Islamic movements view themselves simply as Muslims; they talk only of Islam and abhor all attempts at attaching any (Western) 'ism' to it (moten, 1996:127). through violence and bloodshed but by peaceful persuasion (Moten, 1996)

The northern Nigeria witnessed another series of the maitatsine riots in the 1980s. The radical Muslims who consider moderate Muslims who do not follow the letter of the law to be infidels felt that it was time to do in-house cleaning and self-purification. There was a deliberate attempt to purify Islam from within by eliminating what was considered corrupt and un-Islamic. These within Islam. What ensued were intra-religious crisis? This was the historical circumstances that led to the emergence of the 1980s Saga that has come to be popularly known as the maitatsine riot (udoidem, 1997)

The first of the series of the maitatasine riots was the Kano riot (1980), Bulunkutu-Maiduguri (1982); the jimeta uprising (1984), and the Gombe riot (1985). The central figure in the 1980s Saga was Alhaji Muhammad Marwa. The name maitasine has its origin from his abusive sermons (the name means 'the one who continues to curse'). As far back as 1962, Marwa founded a group which preached against all the indices of modernization. The group believed that any Muslim who reads any other book besides the Qur'an is a pagan. They referred to rich Muslims as unbelievers. Because of his (Marwa) intransigence the Emir of Kano AlhajiSanusi, ordered his arrest and prosecution. He served a three-month jail term and was deported to his hometown, Marwa, in Cameroon (ISichei, 1987).

Maitatsine resurfaced again in Kano, 1980. From their enclave they launched attacks on all those they considered pagans and infidels. This includes both Muslims and Christians. Having been informed that government was planning to call them to order through police action, they launched attack on Kano city. They killed thousands of people in the city (approximately, 4,129) and destroyed property worth millions of naira (Isichei, 1987). It took

the combined effort of the police, army, and air-force to bring the situation under control. The leader of the group was killed and many of the surviving members fled to Maiduguri (Kukah, 1993; udoidem, 1997).

Two years after the Kano (Maitatsine) riot, some of the members of the group who had escaped to Maiduguri staged a comeback in Bulunkutu. Their doctrine and method of attack was similar to at of Kano in 1980, on 26th October, 1982, the group attacked the police and members of the public in reaction to the police arrest of its members. Many lives and property were destroyed in the riot According to Lubeck (1986:309):Themaitatsine phenomenon arose as a response to the collapse of the moral base on which traditional Islamic society has been founded. On the debris Kano state sought to erect a semi-industrial capitalist base whose failure produced the circumstances under which the maitatsine movement arose.

What Lubeck said in essence, is that the maitatsine riot did not wear a religions character, it was also a social upheaval initiated by the oppressed group of society, otherwise known as the Talakawas. The people were disoriented with both the religions and social systems. In their riot they killed both Muslims and Christians. In essence, governance failure was attributed for the emergence of the Maitatsine. Kukah (1993) attest to that observation to him:

Although the Maitatsine Saga might have offered a temporary reprieve as a scapegoat from the political recklessness of the time, it was the political system that produced him and his followers. That he had mobilized so many followers was a testimony of the failure of the political system and the recklessness of the operators, a fact which the long-winded ideological disputations on all sides did nothing to alleviate Maitatsine through cremated, had left an enduring lesion for the politicians regarding substituting good governance with narrow religious rascality.

One interesting thing worth observing about the Maitatsine was their contradictory attitude. They were, vehement in their rejection of western civilization and its technology, yet it was western products of technology like guns that they employed during their riots.

Finally, from the study of the Maitatsine riot, it appears that the conclusion that is often drawn that the Maitatsine uprising was an intra-religious conflict seems misleading because the movement was aggressive to anyone outside its fold. Equally important to note is that the phenomenon of maitatsine has similarly with that of Boko Haram insurgency that emerged recently into the northern Nigeria.

3.4 Background of the Emergence of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria

Nigeria, Africa's top oil producer, survived a brutal civil war into the late 1960s in which more than one (1) million people died. Repeated rounds of violence since then, often between Muslims in the north and Christian in the south, have killed thousands more. The violent spasms are often fuelled by politics, and so it is with Boko Haram. (Brock/ [Reuters], 2012). The group's official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, meaning "people/community committed to the propagation of the prophets (SAW) teachings and Jihad. A reliable insider's report has it that the group was founded in 2002 by the Slain Mohammed Yusuf. It earned its Nickname-Boko Haram from the teachings of its founder Mohammed Yusuf in the early 2000s, in the restive northeast city of Maiduguri the capital of Borno State. The group don't call themselves Boko Haram, but coined by mainstream media and Nigerian government Yusuf argued that western education, or Boko had brought nothing but poverty and suffering to the region and was therefore forbidden, or 'haram' in Islam. He began peacefully-mostly preaching- and quickly gained a following among disaffected young

men in the northeast. However, the late Muhammad Yusuf was not the first northern Nigerian Muslim or Islamic movement, to see, view regard or consider Boko (western education) as Haram (unlawful). ulama of what is today known as northern Nigeria said so more than a hundred years ago, when the white Christian missionaries first came with ilmin Boko (knowledge of western education). From the very beginning, in this part of the world, literacy knowledge has always been associated with religions. Islam brought Arabic/Islamic literacy education. Christian religion missionaries brought Boko (western education) alongside the Christian religion the Malams then saw and justifiably so, Boko in light of the divide between Islam and Kafirci (unbelievers): as an avenue through which the missionaries seek to convert Muslims boys and girls to the Christian faith. Thus, their then conclusion that Boko was Haram as it leads to Kafirci. Fearon (2002), corroborated this view, that;

Boko Haram in the northern part of Nigeria has always been understood as a mockery of the Yoruba word for “book” which is buku. We are aware that there have always been derogatory remarks against western form of education by a good number of Muslim clerics on one hand and its promotion by a good number of our traditional on the other.

To Albani (in Sunday trust, January 1, 2012:14), when the western education was introduced by missionaries to the northern part of Nigeria, Hausa people, especially the local tutors; refused to embrace it, Saying that the education is Boko. Boko is literally translated from Hausa to English as ‘Stupid,’ therefore the local tutors then referred to western education as Karatun Boko, meaning stupid education. This was the reality;

Yusuf was one of the followers of mallam Ibrahim Zak-zaky, the paramount leader of shi’a religious sect that is based in Zaria. The most probable attraction that propelled into the orbit of zak-zakys brand of religious advocacy was Perhaps the outspokenness of the latter as opposed to the doctrinal somnambulism cum ill-disposition of the majority of the northern ‘Ulama to the insensitivity and stark abandonment of state onerous responsibility by the northern political elites. In other words, degenerate ulama and deprave political elite were his immediate drive (Abudugana, 2009).

Agitated by the aforesaid, more so, the lessening religiosity of the Northern Muslims, particularly, the youth, Yusuf began the ultimate search for the root of the menace. In spirit and deed, Yusuf was merely practicalizing what Arnold Toynbee (2008), a renowned historian, theorized as “challenge and response”. He spotted Boko as the focal problem, hence, his long search for how to de-establish the northern Nigeria of its secular politics-cultural configuration, by re-establishing the caliphate. It was within this praxis that he began his de-establishment campaign by raising grave, yet germane questions about the horrendous corollaries of Boko (western education) Vis-a-vis wanton sexual indulgence, divisive nationalistic learning, the banishment of Allah from the public to the private domain, survival of the powerless at the alter of the merciless consumerist mightfuland etcetera. It was only natural that western education comes into the fringe of his ideological purview as did blind westernism. To press home his message to his immediate audience, it behoves that he contextualizes it in the light of the medium and the message, with the source and audience as determinant of how the message is to be placed with the medium. It was within this brace that he deplored the word Boko, a catch phrase in the northern lexicon, particularly among the rural dwellers. As observed above, there are various usages of Boko which include Boko Yana Hana Albarka’ (western education prevents blessing) and Boko owulo (useless). Interestingly, Boko is further used to depict corrupting insincerity and the debacle faced by university or college graduate was upon bagging a degree, sadly end up unemployed.

This leaves us with two models stream of usages and perhaps interpretation. One, disillusionment with western education owing to its secularist outlook and the other, governance/leadership failure. It was within this perspective that Yusuf was addressing the question of western education and its continuo relevance to the people of the northern Nigeria. He went as far as condemning it as Haram (forbidden), hence his call for its rejection. Thus, the phrase 'Boko Haram is the discrete shorthand/naming based on the periodization of the events. Periodization is a top mostly deployed by historian and social scientists to lurk historical events within the diversity of its aura and them into a condensed discrete name. It is so done as to objectify the metaphor which underlies the events being historiographically depicted for instance, September 9-11 is one of such shorthand's impregnated with implicit historiographical meaning of an event of attacks on the twin tower, and some other places in the united state of America. Note be taken of September 9-11 as discrete naming and Al-Qaeda, the name of group, which allegedly masterminded the attack. For this reason, the historical significance inputted into the Maiduguri imbroglio suffers from prejudice and deliberate attempt to recast and reconstruct the actual event being depicted. One can decipher this in the rhetoric which trailed the naming of the late Mohammed Yusuf's led group as 'Boko Haram Sect' by the mainstream media and the government of Nigeria.

Mohammed Yusuf anti-establishment rhetoric and hints that Boko Haram was building and arsenal of weapons also caught the attention of the authorities. In 2009, the police clamped down on sect members who were ignoring a law requiring motorcyclist to wear helmets. That sparked a furious backlash. Police stations and government offices in Borno state were burned to the ground, and hundreds of criminals released in a prison break, as the violence spread across northern Nigeria. The government and army reacted with force; Yusuf was captured and short death in police custody. Five days of fighting left some 800 people dead (Brock[Reuters], 2012).

Boko Haram leaders still cite Yusuf is death as one of the main factors driving the insurgency. The group remains fiercely anti-government and anti-authority, and resentful of the decades of corrupt, poor governance that have impoverished the northern region objectives and ideology.

3.5 Objectives and Ideology of Boko Haram

From the self-descriptive name of the group we can identify two key concepts that indicate its ultimate goal; Dawah and Jihad. The group argue that their set of selected elements its, in reality, the true' Islam, and secondly, key are convinced that this true Islam is holistic and embraces all aspects of Muslims life in eternity. The holism is based on the absolute indivisibility of the: Din (Religion), Dunya (Way of life); and Daula (Government). This indivisibility is supposed to be permanent and eternal. Its ultimate goals boils down to the fulfilment of this mentioned triad. The ideology of the group is: Allah is our Lord; Mohammed; (SAW) is our leader; the Qur'an is our constitution; jihad is our way; and martyrdom is our desire. According to the group, the existing Nigerian State is both wrong and repressive and proposes that interaction with the Boko (western education) is forbidden, and also supports opposition to the Muslim establishment and government of Nigeria. They declared the government of Nigeria as tagut: not worthy of allegiance to be good and up right Muslims. The members of the group do not interact with the local Muslim population and have carried out assassinations in the past of any one who criticises it, including Muslims clerics (Farouk, 2012). The chief argument of the group that Boko is Haram is predicated on the view that the content of some subjects of instructions in our schools contradicts the tenets of the Islamic religion, notably, the Big Bang theory, Darwinism, the law of conservation of matter and energy; and the views of some free thinkers and philosophers that question the

existence of Allah or divine religions. Granted that there are aspects of the contents of western educational curriculum that appeared to be in conflict that the code of the Islamic faith. Before his death, Yusuf reiterated the groups' objective of changing the current education system and rejecting democracy.

Re-emergence after 2009 after the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the group carried out its first terrorist attacks in Borno in January 2010. It resulted in the killing of four people. Since then, the violence has only escalated in terms of both frequency and intensity. In January 2012. Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy to Yusuf appeared in a video posted on you tube. According to Reuters (2002-01-12), Shekau took control of the group after Yusuf's death in 2009. Authorities had previously believed that Shekau died during the violence in 2009. By early 2012, the group was responsible for over 900 deaths (Adam, 2012).

Timeline of Attacks by Suspected Boko Haram Fighters

- 7TH September 2010 Bauchi Prison attack
- 31st December 2010 December 2010 Abuja attack
- 22nd April 2011 Boko Haram frees 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State
- 29TH May 2011 May 2011 northern Nigeria bombings
- 16TH June 2011 the group claims responsibility for the 2011 Abuja police headquarters bombing
- 26TH June 2011 bombing attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri
- 10TH July 2011 bombing at the all Christian fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State
- 11TH July 2011 the University of Maiduguri temporarily closes down its campus citing security concerns
- 12TH August 2011 prominent Muslim cleric Liman Bana is shot dead by Boko Haram
- 26TH August 2011 Abuja bombing- UN Nigeria's office
- 4TH November 2011 Damaturu attacks
- 25TH December 2011 Nigeria state bombings
- 5-6TH January 2012 January 2012 Nigeria state attacks
- 20TH January 2012 Kano bombings
- 28TH January 2012 Nigerian army says it killed 11 Boko Haram insurgents
- 8TH February 2012 Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at the army headquarters in Kaduna.
- 16TH February 2012 another prison break staged in central igeria; 119 prisoners are released, one warder killed.
- 8TH March 2012 during a British hostage rescue attempt to free Italian engineer Franco Lamolinara and Briton Christopher Mc-Manus, abducted in 2011 by a splinter group Boko Haram, both hostages were killed.
- 26TH April 2012-attack on media houses in Abuja and Kaduna
- 29TH April 2012-attack on a worship centre in Beyero University, Kano
- 30TH April 2012-attack in Jalingo targeting the police commissioner
- June 2012-suicide attempt attack on Shehu of Borno and Deputy Governor
- 4TH August 2012-suicide attempted attack on Emir of Fika in potiskum. Source: Sunday trust 10 may 2012

4. Data Analysis

4.1 Governance and Terrorism in Nigeria: Appraising Governance Failure and Boko Haram Insurgence

The state is a complex of institution that provides the basic necessity of life to its citizens (Chiya, 2010). However, in the absence of a capable state, advancement the major sectors will be uneven. This is the case in Nigeria, as over the years it has been characterized to a

very large extent by insecurity. The failure to establish coherent, legitimate and developmental state has rendered it impossible for the country to achieve stable polity and sustainable development. Nigeria has become a weak state plagued by internal conflict becoming less state-like and fails to fulfil its obligations and responsibilities. To many observers, persisting problems of bad governance, instability, stagnation, misery and overall insecurity seem to have become permanent feature of the state. It is in light of the above that this chapter attempts to examine the relationship between governance and the emergence of insurgencies in Nigeria with particular reference to Boko Haram in the northern part of the country.

4.2 Purposes and Responsibility of the State

Security of life and property represent one of the most important constitutional duties of a state. Security, law and order are the foundation on which the successes of all government initiative towards good governance are anchored. The authority of government over the people can be legitimized and sustained only to the extent that it guarantees the security of their lives and properties. According to Slann (1998), the essential purpose of state is, 'to guarantee, a degree of social order that enables society's members to enjoy a maximum degree of physical security.'

Many of the classical philosophers of sixteenth and seventeenth century argued the case for the need to have a state from the assumed inconveniences of an original "state of nature" in where there is no state to mediate between individuals. Hobbes, Nietzsche and others have seen conflict, violence and a struggle for dominance as intrinsic to human nature with a consequent need for a strong state to enforce peace (Tansey, 1995). To the extent that, the state represents a safeguard against the chaos, crime and confusion result from the acts of selfish and conflicting individuals. The state, Aristotle tells which originate for the sake of life continues "for the sake of the best life". Adam Smith (1723-90) in his *Wealth of Nations* (1776), laid down the following proposition: the sovereign has only three duties to attend to:

First, the duty of protecting society violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty to protecting, as far as possible, every member of a society from the injustice or opposition of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual or small number of individuals.

The process of the narrowing down of the purpose of the state reaches its culmination in Herbert Spenser (1820-1903). According to him, the state is nothing but a natural institution for preventing one man from infringing the rights of another; it is a Joint Stock Protection company for mutual assurance.

Locke, Smith and Spenser agreed that the state is a means to an end, the end being a better life for the individual, whether conceived in ethnical terms or not, whether the state is to interfere more or less (Appodarai, 1977). An answer has been provided by the utilitarian school of which Bentham and J.S. Mill are best known exponents. Their point of view is this: All men desire happiness, which may be defined as the surplus of pleasure over pain. The source of pleasure and pain are physical (e.g. good Scenery), and political (e.g. good Laws). In spite of all the criticism, the formula of the greatest happiness of the great number still remains valuable in politics and governance: it supplies a 'Slogan' which gets unprinted in the popular mind and supplies a standard with which one can judge state actions. All actions must be judged by their results; by their fruitfulness is pleasure, and this pleasure must find

actual expression in the lives and experience of individuals. Therefore, the state has a certain set of responsibilities to its people and an array of mechanism it can use to fulfil these responsibilities. But if the authorities failed in these responsibilities, they could claim no rights of sanctity. Therefore, the state can win the allegiance of its citizen only by the efforts it makes to give their right increasing substance. It is now well understood that citizens have certain right and the state has certain obligation.

Throughout the history of the state as an idea, two concepts of power have coexisted: power as a zero-sum game that entails the imposition of one actor's will upon another (associated with Max Weber) and power that arises when a group comes together and cooperates in attaining a collective goal (Hobbes's view of the state empowered by a 'social contract' from the people).

In violent times, the central problem for the state was consolidating force. The birth of modern political theory the time Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Weber, coincided with an era of pervasive violence in Europe that accompanied the birth of the absolute state. In those very violent times, it is not surprising that the idea of the state was conceived of in relation to the use of force. Although Weber's remarks, for instance, is often cited in the literature on political thought, the state's violent role does not, in fact, represent the full expanse of Weber's thinking. A closer reading of his work reveals that the emphasis on the use of force is on its legitimate use (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). Weber also articulates a clear functional view of the state, describing its 'basic function' as the legislature, the police, the judiciary, and the various branches of civil and military administration. Initial conceptions of the state were thus relatively circumscribed: the state was the mechanism through which to consolidate, organise, administer, and maintain the use of violence.

In the 1930s American philosopher John Dewey identified the public as the mechanism for determining government functions. According to Dewey, the very definition of 'the public' resulted from an open discussion of the means and ends of government. The state was not about a small group of leaders dictating to a passive citizenry what had to be done. On the contrary, the state receives its mandate its very legitimacy through its accountability to the people, the constant and rightful monitors of the state. According to Dewey, the functions of the state evolve over time in response to the public consensus on the scale and parameters of the state's activities. And state practice is best revealed through a dissection of public finances and good governance since these indicate most clearly the state's rights and obligations to its citizens; as well as those of the citizens to the state. Franklin D. Roosevelt made clear in his 'four freedoms' speech of 1941 (cited by Ghani and Lockhart, 2008:121):

The basic things expected by our people of their political and economic systems are simple. They are equality of opportunity for youth and for others. Jobs for those who can work, Security for those who need it. The ending of special privilege for the few. The preservation of civil liberties for all. The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider and constantly rising standard of living. These are the simple, the basic things that must never be lost sight of in the turmoil and unbelievable complexity of our modern world, the inner and abiding straight of our economic and political systems is dependent upon the degree to which they fulfil these expectations.

The public cannot be mobilized in the way that Dewey envisaged unless it has clear moral purpose. Historically, morality has been expressed through an agreement about either a common goal or a binding legal contract. According to dominant interpretation, the modern state was inherently about emancipation. The rise of the absolutist state had as its counterpoint the rights of individuals. Today's consensus on the effective state as a necessary

precondition on the eradication of poverty echoes this origin. Rather than cohering around the idea of the use of force, according to Ghani and Lockhart (2008), the state today coalesces around the rule of law. The people judge the state's effectiveness not in the abstract but on the basis of how well it performs its legal functions, however broad or narrow their scope may be. The governed and the government are bound together by a common view of public value and interest, embodied in a compact whether explicit or implicit- of right and obligations. Both challenge and opportunity today are to see the foundation of the state not as situated in violence but as in agreement on a set of rules that allow for an orderly process of change that makes violence unnecessary.

In development countries, the state has often failed to acquire the flexible architectures needed to enter into a dynamic and collaborative partnership with the citizenry. Instead, many suffer from rules that do not prescribed orderly processes for change; as a result, violence becomes the means through which that charge occurs. The state then erodes from within and ultimately provides very few functions for citizens.

4.3 The Nature of the Nigerian State: Governance and Insurgency.

It is difficult to deny the existence of the state in Africa, but it is much more difficult to affirm its existence (Olaitan, 2005). This is because whereas the medley of institutions that exist and function in its name in Africa the bureaucracy, the armed forces, the judiciary, legislature, the executive, the prisons etc makes it impossible to deny its existence, the sheer level of criminality, lawlessness, brigandage and lack of order characterizing such existence calls into question its real meaning. It is well recognized that the state, while enjoying a unique power of legitimate use of force, is essentially an institutionalized order, functioning through the substantial acceptance of its rules and regulations in the society. But the state in Africa exhibits a remarkable inability to institutionalize itself and claim obedience outside the use of force. This is why Bratton (1989) argued that 'the African state is weak by any conventional measure of institutional capacity' while Ake (1996) adds that 'the African state: turns on the calculus of strength;

It is this weakly institutionalized state in Africa that Callaghy (1988) described as a 'Lame leviathan' to the extent that it possesses enormous institutional structures without the capability to translate this into legitimate command of obedience. Indeed, the case is made that in spite of the enormous structural strength of the state in Africa, it suffers a glaring inability to exercise meaningful, rule over its society; the state in Africa relates in a predatory sense of the society. The spectacle of a state without meaningful control over its society is what prompted Jackson and Rosberg (Cited in Bratton, 1989) regard the state in Africa as one with a Juridical existence which existence is based not on internal validation but on the willingness of other states and the international system to recognize it and prop it up. A state with juridical existence however, in spite of the name attached to it, cannot be presented as a functional state. For while international recognition is important to the existence of state, it is essentially defined first by its sovereign mastery and control over its territory and the attendant internal dynamics. Where the control over the internal dynamics is absent, it is difficult to affirm the existences of a state even if the international system thinks otherwise. The absence of control over the internal dynamics of a territory by a so-called state makes such a non-functional entity given that the so-called state is lacking in the performance of the key function of exercising reasonable control over its society and territory.

Perhaps drawing from the implication of the juridical existence of the state in Africa, Clapham (1996) insisted that the African state is essentially a "quasi – state"-one that cannot meet the demands of 'empirical statehood' in the sense that it does not have the capacity to

exercise effective power within its territory. This means that the abiding image of what exists as the state in Africa is a non-functional entity that is invested with the name but is unable to effectively exercise the duties and responsibilities of the state beyond the use of force.

Most analysts have come to a consensus that the nature of the African state system in general significantly contributes to the general state of insecurity (Quaker-Dokubo, 2001). The state in Africa is predatory or what Joseph (1987) called “prebendal”, state being used as a mechanism for the accumulation and the expropriation of the national wealth by a few privileged individuals who control the level of political power. In the functioning of the state, there is a deliberate unwillingness on the part of the power wielders to blur the boundary between the private and public spheres in the state. Thus, Joseph (1999:10) states that “such practices have now gone beyond prebendalism to a system based on pure confiscation of public assets”,

In a prebendal system, legal niceties and procedures governing the operation of state offices are used as cover behind which state resources are appropriated. Thus, the state has been weakened by low identification of the citizenry with the various units of governance.

Many of the civil conflicts in the continent which are clear threats to security, started as manifest group reaction to political exclusion and marginalization. African citizens have generally disengaged from the state, since the state has come to be seen as an external and often oppressive force, the nature of the African state, therefore, accounted for the rampant insecurity and the absence of any semblance of legitimate authority, leaving mere anarchy in most parts of the continent (Quaker-Dokubo, 2001).

The last few decades have witnessed increasingly numbers of states in Africa failing to discharge their functions of the people and Nigeria is one of such states. Many authors have classified Nigeria in the category of a failed state. Evidence of decay according to Osaghae (1998), lays in the unending election malpractices, diminishing citizens’ rights, and resurgence of ethnic/religious upheavals. The net results of all these have been economic crises, waste, officials graft, primitive capital accumulation, pre-bendalization and peripheralization of the economy within the vertex of global capitalism. Osaghae added that: “from the flattery and envy of Nigeria as ‘the Giant of Africa,’ the pride of the Black race,” etc, it lapsed into a lethargic sleeping Giant only to degenerate further and earn the outrage of her embarrassed nationals as a ‘rogue sate’, ‘the open sore of Africa’, and a country where nothing works”.

Nigeria has since 2007 been labelled a “failed state” by the fund for peace and foreign policing magazine. Nigeria also made the list of 20 worse states in 2008. A failed state as has been described earlier as a nation that has failed and fallen short of some basic and fundamental conditions and responsibility of a sovereign state, some of which are erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; inability to provide reasonable public service, widespread corruption and criminality; and an absence or a sustain limitation of the growth of a failed state and the consequence has been the continued insecurity.

Governance failure has been attributed as the genesis of insurgencies in Nigeria. According to Reno (2006) insurgencies emerge in the shadow of state collapse. Added that, “Nigeria seems to be brimming with youth group that criticise corrupt and inept leaders and address fundamental ideological issues such as gross inequality. This group mobilize urban youth who suffer social consequences of corruption and economic mismanagement by the country’s elite. (Boko Haram) is one such insurgency in Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgency is the most potent and visible threat to the Nigerian sate and the citizenry. The group which started

as a peaceful group turned into violent group majority in 2009, claiming responsibility of dead attacks which claimed thousands of lives and properties worthy is billions. Initially, Boko Haram is targets were symbols of authority (Police, Borno State government etc) and limited geographically (Maiduguri) in scope.

In July 2009, President YarAdua deployed the Nigerian army to “Crush” Boko Haram. The leader of the sect was captured alive, and some members arrested from their homes and extra-judicially executed by the Nigerian police. The sect believes that Ali Modu Sheriff, then governor of Borno State and the state commissioner of police took the decision to wipe out its leadership. They regroup and went on what was essentially a revenge mission targeting the police, the Borno State government and other uniformed services of the federal government. That is how Boko Haram evolved from a largely peaceful, fringe Islamic organization to a vengeful sect and currently an anarchist threat to the Nigerian nation (El-Rufai, 2012).

The watersheds in the sect’s activities were the June 2011 bombing of the police headquarters and the August 2011 attack on the UN headquarters. By these actions, the sect established the capacity to operate in the nation’s capital, outside its original geographical location, thus attracting national and global attention. Sadly, between 2009 and 2012, more than 1,000 people have lost their lives as a result of Boko Haram’s attacks in Maiduguri, Potiskum, Damaturu, Jos, Kano, Gombe, Kaduna, Adamawa, Abuja, and Niger. In 2011 alone, Boko Haram attacked 115 times with 550 deaths resulting from indiscriminate Attacks-Churches, institutions, Mosques, social centres, market schools and media houses.

The northern Nigeria has been the hardest hit Maiduguri, Damaturu and with the leading commercial centre, Kano being under military occupation since January 2012. Kaduna, a leading industrial centre has also been repeatedly attacked by the various shades of what is known as Boko Haram, many believe; including the Borno State governor Kashim Shettima that, there are variants of Boko Haram- the real Boko Haram and others fakes-sponsored by the government, politicians and criminal groups- that use the brand to advance their own self-centred agendas.

Many reasons have been advanced as responsible for the transformation of Boko Haram into terrorist and terrorism. For instance observers had attributed the group’s emergence and activities to poverty. Poverty levels in the country, according to Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (2010/11), are raising with almost 100 million people living, on less than N 160 a day despite strong economic growth in the country. The survey shows that the North-West and North-East Nigeria recorded the highest poverty rates at 70 percent and 69 percent respectively. The proportions of those classified as the extremely poor, moderately poor and not-poor Nigerian stood at about 38.7 percent, 30.3 percent, and 31 percent respectively in 2011. The Bureau added that “the situation is likely to worsen with the recent economic crises as a result of the hike in the cost of fuel by the federal government of Nigeria in January 2012, which resulted in increased costs of goods and services by over 100 percent as well as a decline in the purchasing power of most Nigerians, especially those in the states affected by the Boko Haram and worsened by the activities of the security personnel (the military, police etc). The high rate of poverty in the north as shown by the NBS (2010/11) cannot be totally wrong to associated it with the Boko Haram insurgency, according to Herskovits (2012), ‘it was clear in 2009, as it is now, that the root cause of violence and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness. Clinton-a former President of USA observed how the continued religious and economic grievances are fuelling fear, terror, insecurity and instability in Nigeria. Influential Nigerians pleaded with Mr Jonathan’s government not to respond to Boko Haram with force alone. Likewise, the

American ambassador, Terrence P. McCauley, has emphasized, both privately and publicly, that government must address socio-economic deprivation, which is most severe in the north. The resolutions of the Senate Retreat (2012), advocated an “intensified war against corruption, the entrenchment of good governance, the creation of employment opportunities and reduction of poverty and inequality as well as the strengthen of laws relating to insecurity and terrorism among other’s” in Nigeria. Equally, BBC Hausa service-Ra’ai Riga-Programme on Nigeria Anti-Terrorism Law (10/06/2011) identified: injustice, inequality, and poverty and governance failure’ as causes of terrorism in Nigeria.

Unemployment is the primary target of every sensible nation’s economic policy: nationally, at least Two-Three in every five able-bodied Nigerians willing and able to work has no job. Income inequality is another serials problem. According to the national Bureau of Statistics (NBS), in 2010, 65% of Nigeria’s wealth is owned by just 20% of the population. This effectively means that 80% of the population share between them only about one third of the nation’s wealth. This income inequality manifests itself in conspicuous consumption by a few side by side with object poverty experienced by the many. Income inequality, unemployment and poverty have been shown to correlate strongly with increases in violent crimes in societies. This cocktail is what US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Joni Carson referred to when he stated that Nigeria’s Boko Haram was capitalizing on popular discontent with bad governance in Nigeria and the north in particular. Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima corroborated these observations. That, “widespread poverty, illiteracy, high rate of youth unemployment and youth anger provided a fertile ground for the Boko Haram insurgency. The governor added that:

The seeds of the problem had been sprouting in Borno State and in the country for the past 30 years due to a failure of leadership at variants levels.

For example, he said in the last two years, ten local government areas that make up Borno North produced only two students with 5, GCE credit and above who were qualified to secure admission into the university. Shettima said the late Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf:

Despite his misguided ideology, retained the loyalty of his supporters by providing one meal a day to each of his disciplines’. He also had a youth employment scheme, under which he helped his disciples to go into petty trading and wheel barrow pushing. He also arranged cheap marriages between sect members, which enable many of them to marry, which give them personal dignity.

He described the current deployment of soldiers to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency as ‘not the preferred solution, but the soldiers. Are needed for now to protect lives and property’” he said unless a political solution is found, “we could be in for a war of attrition. He described the Boko Haram as a Bermuda triangle made up of three legs: -

1. The sect members
2. The political way of Boko Haram
3. As wild as ordinary criminal who cash in the situation

Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) linked the Boko Haram insurgency to the level of poverty in the north. Bill Clinton, former president of USA, speaking penultimate Monday Feb. 20, 2012 at 17th annual Thursday awards for excellence, made the same argument as Sanusi. In an indirect reference to Boko Haram, Clinton said: It was impossible to end its terror without dealing with the apparent root of the disaffection of its perpetrators, “you can’t just have this level if inequality persist, that’s what is fuelling all

this staff'. Clinton went on to express his reservation about the efficacy of government reliance on wielding the big stick as a solution to the problem.

It is almost impossible to cure a problem based on violence with violence. You have to give people something to look forward to when then wake up in the morning; the former American president was obviously speaking from his experience in his own country. In his 2004 autobiography, my life, he wrote at some length about the race riots of the mid-sixties that tore the American society apart. Those riots were the result of economic and educational opportunity for the blacks.

Substitute Americas racial differences with Nigeria's regional differences and Kenner's commission might as well have been talking about present day Nigeria regional disparities in public revenue are not good for any nation in this respect the leadership in the north have a greater responsibility to have demonstrated good and transparent governance. United Nations warned of increasing poverty accompanied by an increase in regional and income inequality as panacea to violence. According to the UN report (2004:24)

When poverty is added to regional inequalities, the grievances that stoke civil violence are compounded. The combination of a surging youth, population, poverty, urbanization and unemployment has resulted in increased gang violence in many cities of the developed world.

Over the past decades, Nigeria has seen the emergence of new gang groups, a resurgence of old ones which are majorly attributed to poverty and unemployment. Academic staff union of universities in Nigeria (ASUU) concludes that, bombing; kidnappings etc are expression of injustice. ASUU (2012), said; the insecurity problem across the nation was an expression of people's anger on high level of injustice against the masses, hunger, deprivations and failure of government to tackle corruption.

According to Kwanashie (2000:11), Nigeria with all its resources is still one of the poorest in the world. From the family –the primary social groupings to various political and administrative levels, the Nigerian situation shows graphic collapse of governance. He added that “we are faced with problem of corruption, leadership, lack of transparency and accountability in the conduct of public affairs among other thing” as a result of these the economic has remained underdeveloped and the quality of life of the average citizens has worsened progressively. Therefore, the state or governance failure to function encouraged citizen disengagement. Abubakar (2012: 65) summarised the situation thus: the governance failure not only exacerbated disengagement, but even more fundamentally; it eroded the legitimacy of the state because a majority of Africans sank into poverty which destabilized stated – society relations. It hardened the boundaries of ethnic, religious and regional identities as communities turned to these social networks as safety nets and shelter from the increasingly inept state. He added that: “it appears that the root of contemporary humanitarian catastrophes and insecurity in Nigeria is the contentious exclusivist approaches to citizenship right that been upheld by most elites in Nigeria”.

The nature of state determines the nature of economic development therein. If a state permits centralization of power-political or economic- it promotes disharmony and disturbance. Concentration of wealth contributes to poverty and, in turn, poverty gives rise to a great many crimes. The armies of poor, unemployed illiterate, disabled and disgruntled persons may pose a much serious threat to a system than any war machine. If the countries have the lowest rate of crime or terrorism the most important reason is that they do not have islands of prosperity in the ocean of poverty, unlike many third world countries like Nigeria. Functional state with good governance and leadership extinguishes every element of terrorism. It is know well

know that Boko Haram get support in the poverty striking northern Nigeria. This view get support from the following statement of the former UN secretary general, in (Tyagi, 2002) which he made at the time of introducing the item of terrorism in the agenda of general assembly;

The roots of terrorism and violence in many cases lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair; so deep that men are prepared to sacrifice human lives including their own, in the attempt to effect radical change. Undoubtedly, bad governance and leadership qualities across social institutions within the Nigerian society are what led us to this scenario: corruption, injustice, lack of accountability and transparency, underdevelopment, prebendal politics, selfishness and greed among others. No excuse can justify the sect's style of uprising against constituted authority, but it can be categorically stated that the late leader of sect took advantage of irresponsible leadership to work on the psychology of frustrated and messiah waiting innocent citizens. If we had a just, accountable, transparent, uncorrupted, unselfish leadership that has brought about basic infrastructures and gainful employment across the country would there had been a reason for social crises to manifest into a militant confrontation? In a country where electricity is lacking intense darkness, frustration and unemployment are enough to produce people with the mind-set of Boko Haram and even worse.

If the social contract between government and its people remain relatively strong-were the government rule justly, invest in its people and provides economic and political freedom, national survival is reasonably assured. Such favourable conditions become paths for success. However, if the government fails to invest in its people and rules through fear and intimidations and corruption becomes corrosively endemic, the bonds of trust between the government and its people could become irreparable weak and irresponsible to protect its citizens becoming a threat in itself. The Nigerian state is a source of threat because individual citizen faces many threats which emanate directly or indirectly from the state. Such threats are: those arising from domestic law making and enforcement (e.g. the result of excessive policing in form of extra judicial killing of Boko Haram members and prosecution practices); those arising from direct political actions by the state; and those arising from struggles over control of the state machinery (Buzan, 1991). That individual security is affected both positively and negatively by the state, and that the grounds for disharmony between individual and national security represent a permanent contradiction. Unstable and weak institutions do not enjoy general support from the population. At present Nigeria ranks perilous high (bad) and Campbell (2011) described the Nigerian situation as "dancing on the brink".

5.1 findings

Based on the data analysed, the following are the findings:

1. Functioning state is a necessary condition for stability. The Nigerian state suffers from a sovereignty gap between functions desired by the population and the day to day reality of mismanagement, corruption, and disorder. The failure to maintain basic order not only makes fear a constant in daily life but also provides a breeding ground for a small minority to perpetuate criminality and terror.
2. Governance and terrorism is a cause-effect relationship; crime, unemployment, poverty, frustration breed terrorism.
3. Nigeria failed the responsibility to protect and to provide service to its citizens; not having a monopoly on the use of force because there are militias groups that have been operating in the country; and lacking legitimacy for a large proportion of the population.

4. There could be innumerable factors or cluster of factors for the origin and raise of Boko Haram terrorism, but most of them are related to the nature and functioning of political system, economic development, geo- strategic relations and the rule of law.
5. In an ideologically divided world it is difficult to get a universally accepted definition of terrorism. There seems to be a consensus that certain acts like assassination of internationally protected persons, killing of innocent persons, indiscriminate firing or bombing, hostage taking, etc constitute terrorism.
6. Any effective strategy to combat terrorism must be based on cause- effect theory. Accordingly, the eradication of terrorism in Nigeria depends on the eradication of causes underlying terrorism. Eradication is possible only through the eradication of the causes underlying it. Since terrorism is a multidimensional problem, any strategy to combat or eradicate terrorism has to be multi- dimensional.
7. A broad policy outline may be formulated to remove terrorism. The trust of this policy could be that terrorism may be removed by removing the fundamental causes of terrorism, by adopting a carrot- and stick policy by compelling/ inducing/ persuading the terrorists to come to the negotiating table, by bringing the misguided ones into mainstream of life, by eliminating antagonistic difference and by giving psychological comfort to the minds were terrorism is borne.
8. Political solution, police action and psychological healing must be given a coordinated effort. In any case the problem cannot be solved without: (i) changing the nature of state (ii) restraining the fiat of national security; (iii) evolving the limits of self defence; and driven home the point that violence does not pay.
9. That Boko Haram is the manifestation of the severe crises in the Nigerian nation- building project.
10. Poor governance, incompetency, inefficiency, inequality, the lot are the root causes of Boko Haram.

5.2 Conclusion

Boko haram may have expressed extreme views about modernity and westernization. The sect which started in 2002 was a harmless group and its leaders were well known until the authority in Borno state, were it began decided to set the security force against it because of its trenchant criticism of their misgovernance. The attempt in 2009 to execute a final solution to their insuring confrontation with the security forces merely drove them underground after the extra judicial killing of their key leaders, only to rise, phoenix like, and return with vengeance.

There are many issues that the group has through up: For example, their prime goal is to impose sharia law throughout northern Nigeria. They also said they wanted to eradicate decadence, corruption and injustice in Nigeria's body politic. What is clear and what we all see is that Boko Haram remains on the offensive and do not discriminate between friends and foe.

Various explanations of the Boko Haram phenomenon had been offered- the failed or failing state argument, the human needs theory and the frustration- aggression hypothesis. The despair of the present situation in Nigeria, in which bad governance, corruption, general insecurity of lives and properties, collapse of social services, especially education, health, including communication and transport systems and above all electric power supply, all combined, brought along with them the revolution; of failing expectation which have already expressed themselves in the recent crises and insurgencies in all part of the country, but more deadly in the northern part of Nigeria. The state had demonstrated their incompetence and myopic by their forcible reaction at Zaki- Biam, Odi, Maiduguri, Bauchi, Jos, Kaduna, Kano,

and Niger. In all these area the actions and inactions of the state have exacerbated the problems. Poverty, which is the root cause of terrorism and criminalities still remains and even depend all over the country. This situation put in a serious jeopardy the prospect for peace and development.

The state failure to exercise its responsibility/ functions has railroaded Nigeria away from development, human right and security. Rampant conflicts and bombing, political decay and perpetual instability as a result of bad governance have significantly undermined the viability of the Nigerian state. Unless and until the chains of catastrophic governance are broken, Nigeria will continue to dance on the brink.

5.3 Recommendations

1. Strengthening the state institution- judiciary, legislative, the executive and the civil society organization through check and balance.
2. The process of constitution building must be based on good governance as the aspect of politics whereby rules will “play by the rules of the democratic game”. The state building project demands a competent police force, and efficient civil service and independent judicial system operating under the rule of law, and a disciplined military under legitimate civil control..
4. The problem of corruption with its attendant consequences of poverty, unemployment, insecurity and social services decay, is to establish mechanism of accountability. A more practicable solution is that Nigeria needs a new generation of leaders that are nurtured in a democratic political culture of accountability and transparency. On the other hand, there is need for appropriate institution rooted in democratic values that will contribute to development and improve the quality of governance.
5. Approaches to terror focusing wholly on military, police and intelligence measures risk undermining efforts to promote good governance and human right alienate parts of the population and thereby weaken the potentials for collective action against terrorism. Instead, government must find a way of addressing social and economic problems that Boko Haram thrives on.

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