Abstract
Somalia illustrates a persistent gap between formal constitutional commitments to judicial independence and the institutional conditions in which courts operate. The paper argues that executive influence is best understood as structured judicial subordination, the interaction of appointment, fiscal, prosecutorial and constitutional-review arrangements that can reproduce judicial dependence despite formal guarantees of independence. Using doctrinal analysis supported by institutional and comparative analysis, the paper traces this pattern from the 1969 military takeover through post-1991 reconstruction and the constitutional changes of 2024 and 2026. It compares selected safeguards in Kenya and Uganda to identify institutional choices relevant to Somalia. The paper’s central contribution is a framework for analysing judicial dependence through four interacting dimensions: appointments, finance, prosecution and constitutional review. It concludes that reform requires transparent merit-based appointments, protected judicial financing, prosecutorial safeguards and effective constitutional adjudication.

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