IJAAR PUBLISHING®

International Journal of Advanced Academic Research| ISSN: 2488-9849
Vol. 12, Issue 9 (2026) | https://doi.org/10.46654/6y5fh264

Challenges of Insurgency on Socio-economic Activities in Borno State, North-East Nigeria.

By

Lawan Mohammed
Department of General studies
Umar Ibn Ibrahim El- Kanemi College of Education,
Science and Technology, P.M.B 16,
Bama, Borno State, Nigeria.
Correspondence email address: alibemustapha79@gmail.com

Abstract

Borno State, like many other states in Northern Nigeria, has seen many attacks by the notorious insurgent Boko Haram sect that operates in that part of the country. The aim of this study is to assess the challenges of insurgency on socio economic activities in Borno state with the following objectives; to identify the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, access the trend of agricultural production before, and during the insurgency, examine the effect of insurgency on means of livelihood and identify the effect of insurgency on Education and transportation. A total of 401 structure questionnaires were administered to the respondent in the sampled communities. Data collected were presented and analysed using table of simple percentages and charts. Major findings indicated that annual grain flow between Borno and her trade partners was 116,000 tonnes before the insurgency (2000-2012). However, the flow of grain decreased to 66,100 tonnes during the insurgency (2013-2024). While all international trade routes were no more accessible. Agricultural activities grounded as farmlands, rivers and fish ponds were abandoned. The study therefore recommends the following; Government should initiate policy that will generate employment opportunities for the unemployed and desperate youths, government should deploy its security intelligence to fish out those financing the Insurgency, government and NGOs to facilitate return and reintegration, build the population'scapacity through provision of grants and distribution of improved seedlings, encourageimproved irrigation scheme and dry season farming.

Keywords: *Challenges, Insurgency, Boko-Haram, Socio-economic, Borno State*

1. INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

The menace of insurgency has been existing throughout history. It has earlier started in the nineteenth century which occur between Percia and Rome (Brice, 2003). In the Middle East, a breakthrough reaction against Israeli domination by Palestine and perceived injustice as well as the over bearing presence of the United States in the region. The consequent of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US and others across the world have increased the tempo of insurgency across the world moving from the Middle East to North Africa called the Arc of Instability. These has pave the way for Insurgents groups such as; the Al-Qaeda; Al-Shabab; ISIS; Taliban that engaged in unsavory activities such as: kidnapping of innocent people as hostages; suicide bombing; incessant shooting of victims at close range; throat slitting and nocturnal attacks (Taiwo, 2016). The majority victims are predominantly the most vulnerable of the society-children and women many of whom have been orphaned and widowed. These pose great challenge to socio economic development as it relates to loss in the means of livelihood of populace as well as the; destructions of teaching and structures and facilities which rendered educational goal defeated and which affects the socio economic development which thrives in situations where socio-economic economic development which thrives in situations where socio-economic exclusion, maladministration, marginalization of the majority by a privileged few, oppression globally Meanwhile, the desolation and destruction of human lives and properties by the insurgents group (Boko haram) through it indiscriminate activities such as kidnapping of innocent citizens; suicide bombing; destructions of building structures in schools, market places and places of worship, residents; attacks on highways; incessant shooting of victims at close range, bombing of private, public, religious and government properties and throat slitting has resulted in fear, anxiety, trauma emotion and psychological disturbances which lead to shutting down most of the activities that will contribute to socio economic development adversely affects the socio economic development of Borno state. The dangerous nature of insurgents attacks has it impact on student education by instilling fear and anxiety; and thereby rendering the children not to develop interest in joining school; and some drop out of the school. It also affects the schools calendar through it unwanted activities thereby created fear, anxiety, trauma, emotion and psychological disturbances which lead to shutting down school for some certain period in their studies and lack of certainty of life.

Borno State, like many other states in Northern Nigeria, has seen many attacks by the notorious Boko Haram Islamic insurgent sect that operates in that part of the country. Borno State has been revealed as the terrorist group's base of operations in recent discussions (Abinbola, 2012). The group's activities are rife with issues of insecurity, owing to the group's links to the economy, social, political, and governance, all of which have spiralling effects on the people of Borno State (Adams et al, 2014). Nigerians welcomed the restoration of democratic rule in 1999, seeing the potential for a better future under civilian rule. As a result, the International Community lifted Nigeria's trade sanctions and other security constraints. However, as people experienced increased levels of instability, economic difficulties, and the threat of terrorism with the Boko Haram sect at the forefront, optimism quickly turned to anger. Beyond Nigeria's borders, the group has become a threat to both domestic and international security. In 2011, security forces, civilians, churches, mosques, farms, media houses, schools, and the United Nations building were all subjected to violent attacks.

The group has exacerbated several issues that the country is already dealing with, especially in the North-East. Despite the Nigerian government's attempts to contain the insurgent group,

Boko Haram has evolved into a transnational danger, causing increased concern among the international community. Obviously, the repeated violent assaults have devastating consequences. The activities of the Boko Haram sect, for example, pose a significant threat to human security (Msheliza et, al, 2021).

The concept of socio-economy has expanded beyond the preservation of economic activities and social processes (Agbiboa, 2014), to include the protection of citizens from diseases, hunger, unemployment, violations of human rights, displacements and housing issues, conflict, political repression, and enslavement (Agbiboa, 2014).

The incidence of insurgency has destabilized agricultural and socioeconomic activities of the nation especially, the northern part of the country (Ezema, 2013). The instability generated by the insurgency has caused an exact and substantial increase in prices for key agricultural crops produced in the insurgency control areas and exports to other regions of the country, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. This increase in prices is mainly due to a decrease in agricultural output, unavailability of labour, scarcity of farm input, uncertainties at markets and an increase in transportation costs.

It is observed that activities of the insurgents have affected and crippled the socio-economic activities of the places they spread their tentacles, such greatly led to the massive fleet of people from their places of abodes to other relatively safer destinations as internally displaced or as refugees (Ajayi, 2011). Due to persistence of insurgency countless number of people have fled to neighbouring states or southern parts of the country for safety and livelihood (Ali et al., 2018). As gathered from NEMA, (2014), Nigeria accounts for about 13% of Africas internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflict as at January 2011. Between October 2010 and October2011, NEMA gave an account for a total of 3,777,01 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria. As at 2013 alone, 470,500 persons were displaced in Nigeria and that was the third highest in ranking globally during that period.

The phenomenon of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has become a social problem and inimical to economic Development. The population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the north is worrisome because many of them are family men and women who ordinarily are supposed to fend for their family but have found themselves in pathetic conditions. The fact cannot be denied that IDPs have their basic rights to livelihood and existence, food, shelter, education, security among other amenities are indeed basic for livelihood.

Conflict and violence has been blamed on the high rate of poverty in Nigeria. However, some security experts have debunked this assumption. But in the words of experts who persist that whatever argument surrounding the cause of the insurgency, the salient facts cannot be dismissed easily. The most important of this is that, we have to admit that even if the group has its antecedents in theology; its swelling rank is a result of a huge reservoir of unemployed urban youths from many part of the country Mohammed (2012). These youths, who have completely become disenfranchised, are readily to provide the group with foot soldiers who commits all manners of atrocities, including assassination and suicide bombing in the name of religion. Onuoha (2013), empirical study on why do youths join the insurgents here the study indicated that poverty played a major roles in luring the youths in joining the group.

Today, Borno State is one of the most affected states, yet, there is no empirical evidence of the magnitude of the devastation of the area by Boko Haram. The state is mentioned in the larger study of North-Eastern Nigeria. Hence, this study seeks to examine

the challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency on the people of Borno State, especially in the area of socio-economic activities.

Aim and Objectives of the Study

This study aimed to investigate the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency on the socioeconomic activities of Borno State, Nigeria. Therefore, the specific objectives of the study are to:

(i)To identify the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents,
(ii) Access the trend of agricultural production before, and during the insurgency,
(iii) Examine the effect of insurgency on means of livelihood,
(v) Identify the effect of insurgency on Education and transportation.

Scope of the Study

This study assesses the challenges of insurgency on socio-economic activities in Borno state. The study is covered a total of six (6) Local Governments Areas, namely Kukawa, Magumeri (from Northern part), Konduga, Bama (from Central part), Gwoza and Askira/Uba LGAs (from Southern part).

Significance of the Study

This study with leverage policy decisions by the Federal Government on security issues and challenges of refugees and internally displaced persons.

The Federal and Borno State government will be equipped and strengthened with knowledge from this study to understand the operations of the Boko Haram groups with a view of engaging other forms of insurgency. Defence and Strategic studies in higher institutions and training centre would benefit research which provides additional knowledge for insight in terrorism and guerrilla warfare exemplified with the Boko Haram and as different from the operations of other insurgent groups. Researchers on counterinsurgency issues would benefit from the knowledge of Boko Haram experience as they map out counter-insurgency strategies to enrich their research

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptual review

(a) Insurgency

The term insurgency conjures often wild disparate interpretation; suffering at the hands of both experts and pundits". Commonly accepted meanings remain elusive, with predictable conceptual confusion" (Moore, 2007, P2). According to (Mohammed et. al., 2017), the term insurgency continues to be used interchangeably, and inexactly, with warfare such as irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, revolutionary and even terrorism. He further posits that "the interchangeability of terms is understandable, given the diverse nature and adaptability of those who wage insurgency and the overlapping traits of these types of conflict. According to O'Neil (1990), insurgency is a "struggle between a non-ruling group and ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics. The main objective of insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control; it requires the active support of some segment of the population;" "insurgencies do not happen if the population either supports the government or sees nothing to gain from fighting" (Curtas, 2006). According to (Msheliza et. Al., 2021) insurgency is used as a "composite conflict phenomenon which can be defined as a cellular development of resistance against the

government and which expands from the initial stage of subversion-infiltration through the intermediate stage of overt resistance by small armed bands and insurrection by Boko Haram.

(b) Boko Haram

Boko Haram also known as 'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-jihad' is in Arabic, which means "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and jihad". The group which is better known by its Hausa name 'Boko Haram' was a local radical salafist group which transformed into a terrorist organization after 2009 (Cook, 2013). The group is based inNorthern Nigeria, in an area which is predominated by the Kanuri people. Boko Haram which is loosely translated from Hausa language as 'Western education is forbidden' has been vieweddifferently from other perspective, to mean 'Western education or civilization is a sin'. According to Ajayi, (2012) Boko Haram is the product of 'Maitatsine' doctrine or a brand of

Islamic zealots and fundamentalist, which was introduce to Northern Nigeria in 1945. The Maitatsine uprising, which began in 1979 were the historical antecedent of Boko Haram, and has many parallels with the current state of affairs. The Maitatsine movement, under the leadership of Alhaji Marwa Maitatsine, an immigrant, was made up of a bunch of religious fanatics. Marwa believed that Islam has been corrupted by modernization, so they group spearheaded religious uprising in Kano in 1980, which later spread to Yola and Maiduguri in 1982 and 1983 respectively. Boko Haram became a recognized terror group in 2009, after the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf. The group reorganized and lunched series of attacks on innocent citizens, turning many into widows and children into orphans in the Northern part of Nigeria. Their level of activities within the Northern States is as depicted in Figure 2.1 above. Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states have been there most active territory of operation in recent times. There have been 64 recorded incidences of terror attacks by the sect in the North-Eastern region since 2009-2014, with different methods of attacks ranging from armed attacks, bombing and explosions, midnight terror attacks, mass murder/suicide raid, assassination/murder and abductions. These attacks have claimed the lives of not less than two thousand, three hundred and twenty people in 2009, and three thousand in 2010. In 2011, not less than three thousand, five hundred and sixty lives lost and three thousand seven hundred in 2012. Four thousand and twenty lives lost in 2013 and in 2014, not less than five thousand lives have been lost (Nigerian Security Tracker: 2014).

(c) Socio-Economic Development and security

This is used in the study to refer to a monitored, manipulated or encouraged process that brings about changes in the location where people live, work and share things in common as relating to or giving consideration to both social and economic factors.

Socioeconomic Security Socio-economic security in this context is defined as "safety from threats of hunger, disease and repression, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or communities. The UN however warned that socioeconomic security should not be equated with socioeconomic development which is grander even though they are linked.

Furthermore, it argues that "universalism of the life claims is the common thread that binds the demands of human development today with the exigencies of development tomorrow, especially with the need for environmental preservation and regeneration for the future. Socioeconomic security is a vague concept with no specific or universally accepted definition. Nonetheless, scholars are undisputed of the fact that it centres on the security of the economy and health. It is basically an emerging concept which seeks to tackle

fundamental issues threatening human beings and to find long-lasting solutions to them as its advocates that the reference to security is the individual first, rather than the state (Msheliza et, al 2021)

Theoretical framework

Frustration – Aggression Theory

Frustration-Aggression Theory of Conflict The frustration-aggression theory has its root in the works of Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mower and Sears (1939). Dollard led a research group at the Yale Institute of Human Relations and published a monograph that is useful in explaining human conflict behavior. It is based on a simple and straight forward hypothesis that human frustration may lead to aggressive behavior. Since the development of the theory, several scholars have analyzed it. For example, it was observed that frustration ultimately leads to aggression and aggression always implies that frustration has occurred at some previous time (Lawson, 1965).

The theory suggests that individuals become aggressive when there are obstacles (perceived andreal) to their success in life (van de Good et al., 1996). The theory indicates that aggressive behavior is not motivated by genuine hostility, but by frustration (Malici, 2007). All the discussions on the theory imply that "there is no smoke without fire" and that "an angry man is a hungry man". At this stage, let us look at the duo concepts of frustration and aggression. Frustration can be defined as (a) an individual's perception of a hostile environment, coupled with (b) hispessimism about the realization of goals and (c) the perception that the fate of these goals is in the hands of others (Malici, 2007). Aggression is any behavior intended to harm another person who does not want to be harmed (Bushman & Huesmann, 2010).

Frustration-aggression theory emphasizes the difference between what people feel they want and the discrepancy. However, marginal between what is sought and what they get, the greater the violent reaction. In the face of these frustrated expectations, a group is most vulnerable to embark on violent destructive behavior or be a ready army to be used to cause crisis. Central to this explanation is that aggression is the natural outcome of frustration.

Frustration-aggression theory emphasizes the difference between what people feel they want and the discrepancy. However, marginal between what is sought and what they get, the greater the violent reaction. In the face of these frustrated expectations, a group is most vulnerable to embark on violent destructive behavior or be a ready army to be used to cause crisis. Central to this explanation is that aggression is the natural outcome of frustration.

The relevance of this theory to the study of insurgency on socio economic activities is better appreciated when viewed against the backdrop of wide spread of poverty, illiteracy, socio-economic injustice, global terror epidemic and proliferation of arms which breeds frustrated expectations. Under this misfortunate situation, members of the sect (Boko haram) and other frustrated persons are readily available to be recruited under the auspices of Boko haram insurgent as destructive agents for disturbances and indiscriminate destruction of livelihoods and social support systems, bombing of infrastructures and facilities, displacing residents to seek refuge, incessant killings, kidnapping/abduction of innocent citizens as well which adversely affect means of livelihood, education and transportation.

METHODOLOGY

The study area is Borno State located at longitude 11°30′N, and latitude 13°0′E in North-Eastern Nigeria created on 3rd February 1976. The state covers a total area of 70,898 square

kilometres and had projected population of 6,651,590 in 2023 at 2.4% annual population change (NPC, 2020). Borno State has twenty-seven (27) Local Government Areas.

The State shares borders with Adamawa to the south, Yobe to the north, Republic of Niger to the North-East, Chad and Cameroon to the East. The greater part of the state lies on Chad formation. This is an area that was subjected to prolonged continental and lake sedimentation as a result of the down warp of the Chad basin in the Pleistocene period.

Types and Sources of Data Acquired

In order to achieve the aim of objective of this study, this study used both primary and secondary data sources.

Primary Data Sources

The main research instrument here is the questionnaire which was administered in different locations of the study area. The questions included information like sex, age, level of education attained, income levels, Access the trend of agricultural production before, and during the insurgency, Examine the effect of insurgency on means of livelihood and Identify the effect of insurgency on Education and transportation.

Secondary Data Sources

This data includes the existing official and unofficial water related articles from both national and international publications, including books, journals, conference papers, thesis, dissertations and national survey reports, where literatures on water supply related issues in general were obtained from, so as to further enrich the quality of the research.

Data analysis: In the data analysis descriptive statistics such as table of simple percentage, bar and pie chart were used to answer the objectives.

Sampling Technique and Sampling Size

Multistage sampling technique was used in selecting the respondents from the study area. In the First stage the study area was divided into three (3) senatorial zones that make up the state. These include Northern, Central and Southern Zones. In the second stage, simple random sampling technique was used in selecting two (2) Local Government Area from each of the three senatorial Zones. These include Bama and Konduga from (Central zone); Kukawa and Magumeri from Northern zone, Gwoza and Askira/Uba from Southern zone. In the third stage a total of 18 communities were selected from the six LGAs selected across the three (3) senatorial zone as shown in Table 1. Systematic sampling procedure was employed in the selection of the respondents. A total of 401 questionnaires were distributed to the respondents from the selected communities as presented in table 1.

Table 1: Sampling Size selection plan

Senatorial Zones	LGA selected in each Senatorial Zone	Community selected	Number of farmers	Sample Size Selected at 20%
Borno Central	**Konduga** -	Dalori	120	23
		Kawuri	100	20
		Auno	128	26
	Bama -	Abbaram	105	21
	-	Dar Jamal	110	22
	-	Bama	125	25
Borno North	**Kukawa** -	Baga	100	20
	-	Cross Kauwa	105	21
	-	Kukawa	110	22
	Magumeri -	Magumeri	114	28
	-	Allili	97	19
	-	Ardoram	107	21
Borno South	**Gwoza**-	Pulka	115	23
	-	Gwoza	120	24
	-	Kirawa	105	21
	Askira/Uba -	Lassa	107	21
	-	Wamdeo	105	21
	-	Uba	114	23
TOTAL	**6**	**18**	**1943**	**401**

Authors Field work, 2026

Results and Discussion of Findings

Table 2: Socio-economic characteristics of respondent

Variables	Frequency	Percentage (%)
(a) Age		
(i) 26-35	80	21 %
(ii) 36-45	140	34 %
(iii) 46-55	110	27 %
(v) 56 years & above	71	18%
	401	**100**
(b) Sex		
(i) Male	250	62 %
(ii) Female	151	38 %
	401	**100**
(C) Educational Status		
(i) Primary	150	37 %
(ii) Secondary	130	33 %
(iii) Quranic	121	30%
	401	**100**
(d) Occupation		
(i) Farming	220	55 %
(ii) Animal Hardening	130	32 %
(iii) Trading	51	13 %
	401	**100**
(e) Marital status		
(i) married	254	63 %
(ii) Divorced	80	20 %
(iii) Widowed	67	17 %
	401	**100**

Source: Author's field work, 2026.

Table 2 shows the socio-economic characteristics of respondents in the study area. Such characteristics include the following: Age, Sex, Educational status, Occupation and Marital status and level of income.

From the presentation in Table 2 reveals that respondents between the ages of 36-45 years constitute the majority with 34%, followed by those aged 46-55 years with 27%. While 26-35 years with (21%), while those with 56 years and above is the lowest with (18%) only. By implication, the findings showed that the dominant age group is 36-45 years (34%), they are able-bodied men or active age group that participate actively in farming and other socio-economic activities.

On the gender, the finding revealed that, males respondents is 62% outnumbered their female counterparts with 38% only. The representation of both male and female among the sampled respondents helped to accommodate the possible variation of opinion on issues explored in the study. The level of educational attainment of the respondents in the study area reveals that 37% had attended primary education, while 32% had secondary, while 30% attended Quranic education. The occupation of respondents in the study area reveals thatmajority of them engage in farming with the highest percent of (55%), animal hardening (33%), while traders constitutes with (12%). Highest percentage of respondents are married with children and

engage in farming and animal hardening as their major means of occupation by implication, therefore, this is the reason why insurgency has affected their means of livelihood because they can't go to farm graze their animals. However, on the marital status those married among them were 63%, divorced 20%, and widowed 17%.

Effect of insurgency on crop production before and during the insurgency.

Table 3: Trend of crop Production in the study area from 2000-2024

Major Crops Produce	**Tones**	
	Before insurgency 2000-2012	**During insurgency 2013-2024**
Millet	23,400	13,100
Beans	30,200	15,100
Maize	20,200	17,400
Groundnut	17,510	13,000
Rice	12,300	7,500
Total	**116,000**	**66,100**

Source: Borno State Agricultural Development Programme (BOSADP), 2024

Effect of insurgency on crop yield was presented in table 3 above the results of the crop yield in tonnes between 2000-2012 (before insurgency) and 2013-2024 (during insurgency). The results show significant drops in the crop yield of millet, rice, maize, beans and groundnut in Borno state. The findings revealed that in the first period between 2000-2012 the production of millet, corn, maize, beans and groundnut was 116,000 tonnes, while in the second period during the peak of insurgency production has declined to 66,000 tonnes. The study is similar to work of Anjikwe *et al* (2021).

The Significant reduction in the output of crops is due to a combination of multiple factors; first, there has been reduction in the availability of labour due to the threat of attacks on farmers on their way to their fields. Both farmers and farm labourers feared the attacks on their farms or IEDs planted on the roads to their farms. Therefore, lack of labour had caused inadequate and improper timed weeding and harvesting. Secondly, the crop farmers had experienced increased prices of seed, fertilizer, herbicide and pesticide and, inadequate supply of such inputs. Thirdly, high level of insecurity associated with working in the field, distant farms were hit hardest, as farmers were cut off from their fields and thus unable to produce their crops. Large farms are often merely a reflection of large families, which cultivate multiple plots or have big herds of cattle. They were the most affected because they could not cultivate all of their land and could not access adequate inputs. Fourthly, the time to go to the farm and work is too short, the farmer's will be allowed to work from the farm from 9:00 am- 2:00pm (6 hours) as against normal time of 7:00am-5:00 (10 hours).

This implies that insurgency has greatly affected agricultural production in study area. From the table 3 above, it is clear from the produce that the trend have been falling across the years.

4.3 Effect of insurgency on means of livelihood

The figure 1 below revealed how activities of Boko Haram insurgency has affected the means of livelihood of the people in the study area, this include; agriculture, businesses, infrastructures, livestock etc.




Fig. 1 Effect of Insurgency on means of livelihood

Figure 1 above shows that 36% of the respondents agreed that insurgency has affected agricultural goods in the study area. Based on majority rule, it can be concluded that agricultural facilities has been affected by insurgency in the selected local government areas which negatively affected their means of livelihood as majority of them are peasant farmers.

The finding also revealed that 26% of the respondent agreed that activities of the insurgence have affected their business/market in the state.

On the aspect of infrastructural facilities, the finding revealed that 24% of the respondents strongly agreed that infrastructural facilities have been destroyed by the insurgents in the study area mostly basic social amenities like boreholes, health care, electric and telecommunication facilities among others. Furthermore, the finding also revealed that 14% of the respondents has agreed that livestock has also been affected. The activities of the insurgence also destroyed houses and assets of individuals in the study area.

In conclusion analysis of figure 1 above shows that agricultural goods, infrastructural facilities, markets and businesses has been damaged by the insurgents.

4.4 effect of insurgency on Education

This section discuss how activities of insurgency has effects on means of education such as academic calendar, quality of teaching, school infrastructure, availability of teachers, access to learning items, student/pupils attendant in the study areas.

Table 4 effect of insurgency on Education

Variables	Frequency	Percentage (%)
(i) Academic Calendar	130	32%
(ii) Quality of Teaching	105	26 %
	110	28 %
(iii) School Facilities	56	14 %
(v) Student enrolment		
Total	**401**	**100**

Source: Authors Field Work, 2026.

On the issue of effect of insurgency on education, the finding as shown in table 3 above revealed that 32% of the respondents agreed that activities of Boko Haram insurgency has affected academic calendar in Borno state especially for primary and post primary school Furthermore, the findings showed that Quality of teaching in the local government has been affected by insurgency not provided by the local governments. This is so because 26% of the respondents that it has affected quality of teaching.

In terms of School facilities/infrastructure, 28% of the respondents strongly agreed that Infrastructural facilities have suffered damages or destroyed by the Boko Haram insurgency.

On the aspect of Availability of teachers, the respondents strongly agreed that teachers are not available. Therefore, insurgents have affected the Availability of teachers in the local government areas in which over hundreds of teachers lost their life. Access to learning items for schools in the study area is affected.

The table also shows that student enrolment has been a challenge brought by the insurgency in the study area student turnover is affected by insurgency. Their by forcing the parents to widrawn their children from school or transfer them to another school.

Table: 5. Breakdown of destruction caused by Boko Haram Insurgency to Education in Borno State

Number of Primary school destroyed	Number of Secondary school destroyed	Number of tertiary institution destroyed	Number of teachers killed	Number of classroom destroyed
503	38	2	350-611	5,335

Source: Borno State Universal Basic Education Board (SUBEB), 2017.

Table 5 above revealed that a total of 541 schools were destroyed by Boko Haram between 2011-2017, that include 5,335 classroom in 503 primary schools and 38 high school and 2 tertiary institution. And about 611 teachers were killed.

Table: 6 Effect of Boko Haram insurgency on transportation

Variables	Frequency	Percentage (%)
(i) High cost of transport fare	140	35%
(ii) Reduction in physical	105	25 %
mobility	95	24 %
(iii) Closure of some major roads	65	16 %
(v) Time management		
Total	**401**	**100**

Source: Authors Field Work, 2026.

On the issue of effect of insurgency on transportation, the findings in table 6 above revealed that 35% of the respondents revealed that there is high cost of transport fare across the state. The result indicates that transportation has been affected by Boko Haram insurgency.

On the reduction on physical mobility 25% of the respondents revealed that there is reduction in physical mobility in Borno State. Therefore, transportation of goods and services will be restricted, as the security personnel mount check points. As a result of increased in the cost of transportation, the cost of goods and services, products and food price has also increased.

Activities of insurgency has also forced for the closure of some major roads, therefore the motorist has to look for alternative roads as 24% of the respondents attest to it. While 16% affirm to timing.

Conclusion and recommendations

From the data obtain in the study, it is concluded that insurgency has significantly affected socio economic development in Borno state. Insurgency has affected growth and development in every society and constitutes threat to lives and properties, hinders economic activities, and discourages all sorts of investments and consequently stifles and retards socio-economic and political development of Borno State. Age long domestic insurgency in the Borno State has caused serious downtrodden consequences on lives and properties. The activities of the insurgency have wrecked serious humanitarian crises in the state, innumerable numbers of people were displaced, markets and shops were razed down, schools were shut down and education process halted, infrastructures were destroyed leaving the state in a seeming perpetual backwardness.

Meanwhile, the following recommendations have been made as:

- Government should initiate policy that will generate employment opportunities for the unemployed and desperate youths.
- The government should deploy its security intelligence to fish out those financing the insurgency.
- Security should be an imperative priority by the government and partners to facilitate return and reintegration of displaced people.

REFERENCES

Abimbola, J. O., & Adesote, S. A. (2014). Domestic terrorism and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: Issues and trends. *Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society, 4*(2), 2–13.

Adams, D. (2014). Ethnic and regional violence in Nigeria: Implications for national security. *Journal of Politics and Law, 7*(1), 3–11.

Agbiboa, D., & Maiangwa, B. (2014). Nigeria united in grief; divided in response: Religious terrorism, Boko Haram and the dynamics of state response. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 14*(2), 11–12.

Ajayi, A. I. (2012). Boko Haram and terrorism in Nigeria: Exploratory and explanatory note. *Global Advanced Research Journal of History, Political Science and International Relations, 1*(5), 103.

Ali, M. A., Atiyah, U., Zakuan, A., & Zaki, M. (2018). *The negative impact of Boko Haram insurgency.* [Publication details not provided].

Anjikwi, Y., Bashir, A., Pilngwa, T., & Adamu, A. (2021). Assessment of the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on crop production in Hawul Local Government Area, Borno State, Nigeria. *Journal of Agricultural Economics, Environment and Social Science, 7*(1), 266–277.

Bushman, B. J., & Huesmann, L. R. (2010). Aggression. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (5th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 833–863). John Wiley & Sons.

Ezema, O. O. (2013). The socio-economic implications of the Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria, 2009–2013. *International Journal of Innovation and Scientific Research, 11*(1).

Malici, A. (2007). Thinking about rogue leaders: Really hostile or just frustrated? *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, 1–9.

Mohammed, M., Ibrahim, N., & Suliman, N. (2017). *Curbing violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram insurgency* (ICG Africa Report No. 216).

Mshelizah, S., Binga, L. S., & Kaka, O. (2021). Impact of Boko Haram insurgency on the socioeconomic development of Borno State, Northern Nigeria. *African Journal of Law, Political Research and Administration, 4*(1), 36–51.

Muhammad, W. C. (2012). *The impact of rising terrorism and military operations on socioeconomic culture of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan* (pp. 19–21).

National Emergency Management Agency. (2014). *Report on insurgency in Maiduguri, Nigeria.*

Onuola, F. C. (2014). *A danger not to Nigeria alone: Boko Haram's transnational research and office.* Abuja, Nigeria: Wuse II.

Taiwo, A. A. (2016). *Security implications of Boko Haram insurgency for Nigeria and Niger Republic diplomatic relations*. Department of Political Science and International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Van de G. Luc, Rupesinghe, K., & Sciarone, P. (1996). *Between development and destruction: An enquiry into the causes of conflict in post-colonial states*. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.